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10o  December  10,  1998 
Mr. John D.  Parkyn 
Chairman of the Board 
Private  Fuel Storage, L.L.C.  
P.O.  Box C4010 
La Crosse, WI  54602-4010 
SUBJECT:  REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL  INFORMATION  (TAC NO. L22462) 
Dear Mr.  Parkyn: 
The staff of the Nuclear Regulatory  Commission has reviewed Private  Fuel Storage, L.L.C.'s 
(PFS's) three partial responses to the first request for additional  information (RAI)  and the 
subsequent updates submitted  to PFS's application to construct  and operate an away-from
reactor independent spent fuel storage installation  (ISFSI)  on the reservation of the Skull Valley 
Band of Goshute Indians.  The staffs review has resulted in a second RAI which has been 
divided into five sections.  Section 1 consists primarily of siting issues associated  with 
information  in the Safety Analysis  Report.. Section  2 deals with the Emergency Plan.  Section 3 
is concerned with the Safeguards and Security  Plan; Section 4 refers to a proposed  Intermodal 
Transfer Point discussed  in the License Application which  is the subject of a contention before 
the Atomic Safety and  Licensing Board (ASLB);  and Section 5 requests additional financial 
information.  Section 3 is the only section where information  needed for the staffs safety 
evaluation has not been requested previously.  
In responding to the first RAI,  PFS, with the staff's agreement,  proposed submitting four partial 
responses to this RAI.  To date, PFS has submitted three of the four partial  responses.  PFS has 
indicated that there will be a delay in the submittal of the fourth response.  Therefore, the fourth 
partial  response to the first RAI  will not be available  until after this second RAI  has been 
provided to PFS.  Consequently, the staff will  review that response at the same time that it 
reviews your response to the second RAI.  This allows the remainder of the PFS review to be 
carried out under the staff s standard review process which provides for the issuance of all RAls 
for a given round at one time and receipt of all responses at one time.  We have found that this 
is the most effective way to ensure that a comprehensive safety review is accomplished  while 
making efficient use of our limited staff resources.  
Upon receipt of all outstanding responses to the first and second RAls, the staff will determine 
whether it can proceed to write a safety evaluation report  (SER) for the non-cask specific 
aspects of this application or if significant additional information  is still necessary.  The quality 
and completeness of the PFS response to all  RAI's will be a major factor in this determination.  If 
the staff finds that the revised PFS safety analysis report (SAR) is sufficient to allow for a safety 
evaluation  to be written, we will proceed to prepare an SER.  If  the responses to the first and 
second  RAls are not complete, we will assess whether this will impact the safety  review 
schedule.  ,0 
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As discussed with PFS representatives  in  public meetings  on March 22,  1998, and November 
12,  1998, the staff is concerned that PFS has not provided the staff with  its plans for submitting 
the information necessary  to determine that at least one of the cask systems referenced  in the 
PFS SAR is compatible with the bounding site-specific parameters  designated by the vendor.  In 
particular, the design basis horizontal  and vertical seismic acceleration  levels for both the Holtec 
HI-STORM  and Sierra Nuclear TranStor cask designs are far below the levels of .67g horizontal 
and  .69g vertical accelerations reported  for the PFS site.  The staff expects that PFS will submit 
the information  necessary to support use of at least one of the designated  cask designs at the 
Skull Valley site in February, along with the responses to all outstanding  RAIs.  This will ensure 
that review resources will  be available and will allow the review of these analyses and 
information to be factored  into our schedule.  If you do not intend to provide this information  in 
February, we would  like to meet with you at your convenience,  but as soon as possible, to 
discuss this issue.  
A non-proprietary  version of Section 5 of this  RAI has been prepared  and will be provided to the 
Service Lists and made publicly available.  
Please provide your response to this RAI within 60 days of receipt of this letter.  The NRC staff 
is prepared to meet with  PFS, either in person or via teleconference,  to assure that you 
understand this  RAI and any other matters discussed  in this letter.  
If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact  me at (301)  415-8518.  
Sincerely, 
Mark S. Delligatti,  Senior Project Manager 
Licensing and  Inspection  Directorate 
Spent Fuel Project Office 
Office  of Nuclear Material  Safety 
and Safeguards 
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As discussed with PFS representatives  in public meetings  on March 22,  1998, and  November 
12,  1998, the staff is concerned that PFS has not provided the staff with its plans for submitting 
the information necessary to determine that at least one of the cask systems referenced  in the 
PFS SAR is compatible with the bounding site-specific parameters  designated  by the vendor.  
For instance, the design basis horizontal and vertical seismic acceleration  levels for both the 
Holtec HI-STORM and Sierra Nuclear TranStor cask designs are far below the levels of .67g 
horizontal  and .69g vertical accelerations reported for the PFS site.  The staff expects that PFS 
will  submit the information necessary to support use of at least one of the designated cask 
designs at the Skull Valley site in February,  along with the responses to all outstanding  RAIs.  
This will ensure that review resources will be available and will  allow the review of these 
analyses and information  to be factored  into our schedule.  If you do not intend to provide this 
information in February, we would like to meet with you at your convenience,  but as soon as 
possible, to discuss this issue.  
A non-proprietary  version of Section  5 of this RAI  has been prepared  and will be provided to the 
Service Lists and made publicly available.  
Please provide your response to this RAI  within 60 days of receipt of this letter.  The NRC staff 
is prepared to meet with PFS, either in person or via teleconference,  to assure that you 
understand this RAI  and any other matters discussed  in this letter.  
If you have  any questions regarding this letter, please contact me at (301) 415-8518.  
Sincerely,  /  / 
Mark S. Delligatti, Senior Project Manager 
Licensing and Inspection  Directorate 
Spent Fuel Project Office 
Office of Nuclear Material  Safety 
and Safeguards 
Docket  No.:  72-22 
Enclosure:  Request for Additional  Information
cc:  Service ListsSECTION  1 - SITING  ISSUESRequest for Additional  Information 
This Request for Additional  Information  (RAI)  was developed based on Private  Fuel  Storage 
Facility (PFSF) responses to the first round of RAls and a reexamination  of the Conduct of 
Operations chapter of the PFSF Safety Analysis Report  (SAR) using the updated version of 
NUREG-1567.  
The assumption has been made that commitments  resulting from the first round of RAls will be 
carried out to the satisfaction of the reviewers.  Such commitments  include, but are not 
limited to: 
"*  Tracking and evaluating changes made in referenced  cask SARs (RAI  1-1).  
"*  Conducting and reporting  geophysical investigations  (RAI  2-5).  
"*  Submitting  structural calculations and drawings  (RAI 4-0).  
"*  Developing procedures for implementation  of the technical specifications  (RAI  10-3).CHAPTER 1-INTRODUCTION  AND  GENERAL DESCRIPTION  OF INSTALLATION 
The following regulatory  requirements are applicable to the requests for additional information 
(RAls) in this chapter:  10 CFR 72.2(a)(1);  72.11; 72.22; 72.24(a),  (b),  (c)(3),  (j),  (n); 72.28(a); 
72.40(a)(3),  (5); and 72.236(a) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission,  1997).  It should be noted that 
other regulatory  requirements may  be applicable to Chapter 1 of the Safety Analysis 
Report (SAR).  
Section 1.4 Spent Fuel Transportation to the PFSF 
1-1  The applicant must demonstrate that the newly identified  rail spur connecting  the 
potential  Low,  Utah location to the site is considered  in demonstrating compliance with 
10 CFR 72.92 which requires that natural  phenomena must be identified and their effects 
assessed with respect to the safe operation of the ISFSI.  
The rail spur will trend east-west in the vicinity of the PFSF for about 3 miles.  The 
railroad embankment may present an obstacle to overland  flow in the vicinity of the 
PFSF.  The effect of the railroad embankment on the  ISFSI with respect to flood 
heights and velocity of flow during runoff events should be evaluated.
2CHAPTER 2-SITE CHARACTERISTICS
The following regulatory  requirements are applicable  to the RAIs  in this chapter:  10 CFR 
72.24(a);  72.90; 72.92; 72.94; 72.96(a);  72.98; 72.100; 72.102; 72.104; 72.106;  72.108; 
72.122(b);  and Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission,  1997).  It 
should be noted that other regulatory requirements  may be applicable to Chapter 2 of the SAR.  
Section 2.6.1.12  Stability of Foundations for Structures and Embankments 
2-1  Provide additional  information to explain how the soil classifications given in 
Attachment  1 of Appendix  2A were obtained.  
The laboratory testing program described in Attachment 2 of the appendix indicates 
that only two specimens (from boreholes  B-4 and C-2) were tested for Atterberg 
limits, three specimens  (from boreholes A-4, D-1,  and D-4) were tested for fine
particle fraction,  and four specimens (from boreholes A-1,  A-3, D-1,  and D-4) were 
tested for particle-size gradation for the proposed emplacement area (approximately 
4,000,000  ft2).  This does not explain how the soil classifications  were obtained.  
2-2  Provide  additional explanation  regarding soil analyses: 
(a) Discuss why  soil compressibility  parameters obtained from three specimens at 
depths of 10.8, 11.2,  and 11.4 ft in borehole  C-1  and one specimen at depth  of 10.9 ft 
in borehole C-2 were determined to be applicable  to the top 25-30 ft soil layer over 
the entire proposed emplacement area (approximately 4,000,000 ft2).  
(b)  Explain why values of undrained shear strength obtained  from one specimen at 
depth of 10.4 ft in borehole B-4 and one specimen at depth of 11.1  ft in borehole C-2 
were determined to be applicable  to the top 25-30 ft soil layer over the entire 
proposed emplacement area (approximately 4,000,000 ft2).  
(c)  Demonstrate that the value of standard penetration  resistance, N, was determined to 
be  15 for the top 25-30ft soil layer over the entire proposed emplacement area 
(approximately 4,000,000 ft2) (Figure 2 of Appendix  2A),  considering the lateral  and 
depth variation of N values observed in different boreholes (Attachment 2  of 
Appendix  2A).  
Section 2.4 Surface Hydrology 
2-3  Justify the exclusion of the upstream drainage area  in Skull Valley south of the proposed 
PFSF (addition  of as much as 250 square miles to the currently evaluated drainage area) 
and the associated possible runoff in the PFSF flood assessment and PMF studies.  
The proposed  PFSF sits in an area where it might be affected  by runoff from three 
distinct drainage areas i) Hickman  Knolls Basin, ii) Basin I (SAR), and  iii)  the area up 
slope to the south of the proposed PFSF.  The SAR considers the effects of runoff 
from the Hickman Knolls basin (about .93 sq mi) and Basin I (about 26 sq mi)
3extending to the east of the proposed PFSF site but does not mention or consider the 
upstream area (over 250 sq mi) which extends approximately 26 miles to the south of 
the PFSF as a potential source of runoff and possible flooding at the PFSF site.  Any 
increase in flood height or water velocity in the vicinity  of the site due to the inclusion 
of the upper watershed/basin  runoff might have an adverse impact on proposed 
structural components at the PFSF site and should be considered in determining the 
impact on the design bases.  The applicant must demonstrate that the facility  is in 
compliance with  10 CFR 72.92 which requires that natural phenomena be identified 
and their effects assessed with respect to the safe operation  of the ISFSI.  
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4CHAPTER 3-PRINCIPAL DESIGN CRITERIA
The following  regulatory requirements are applicable  to the RAls in this chapter:  10 CFR 
72.24(c);  72.40; 72.82(a);  72.106(a),  (b),  (c); 72.120(a),  (b);  72.122(a),  (b),  (c), (d), (e), (f),  (g), 
(h),  (j),  (k);  72.124(a),  (b),  (c); 72.126(a); 72.128(a),  (b);  72.130; 72.182(a);  and 72.236 (e), (f), 
(g), (k) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission,  1997).  It should be noted that other regulatory 
requirements  may be applicable  to this chapter.  
0  There are no further requests for this section at this time.
5CHAPTER 4-INSTALLATION  DESIGN
The following  regulatory requirements are applicable  to the RAls in this chapter:  10 CFR 72.11; 
72.24(b), (c),  (d), (i), (I)(2); 72.26; 72.40; 72.44(c); 72.70; 72.82(c); 72.106;  72.120(a);  72.122 
(a), (b),  (c), (d), (f),  (g),  (h)  (k),  (I);  72.146; 72.154; 72.162; and 72.236 (Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission,  1997).  It should be noted that other regulatory  requirements  may be applicable to 
this chapter.  
Section 4.2  Storage Structures 
4-1  Justify the use of the referenced cask systems at a site where the ambient or off-normal 
conditions appear to be an unanalyzed temperature  condition.  
The SAR states that the PFSF has established a site design ambient temperature of 
110  OF based on the recorded  high temperatures  in the Skull Valley, which range 
from  105  OF to 109  OF.  The HI-STORM  and TranStor storage casks are designed for 
a lower daily ambient air temperature of 80  OF and 75  OF,  respectively.  Both systems 
have an off-normal design temperature range from -40  °F to 100 OF.  
4-2  a)  Clarify the thermal energy balances between the concrete pad, casks, and 
environment.  
b)  Demonstrate that the "chimney effect" incorporated  into the design of the TranStor 
and HI-STORM  casks is unaffected.  
"  In addition to the heat generated by the spent nuclear fuel (SNF), the thermal 
energy balance needs to address heat from the environment, thermal energy loss 
from the concrete  pad to the surrounding  soil, and convection  and radiation to the 
atmosphere.  
"  The concrete storage  pad will act as a receptor for thermal energy and may serve 
as a stored heat source.  The concrete pad will be heated and cooled by the 
environment.  Because of the heat-retaining  nature of the concrete  pad, the air 
temperature  near the ground will be higher than the temperature  15 ft above.  
This will have an impact on the ventilation system for the casks, which relies on 
natural convection,  in which  cool air is drawn into the cask inlets and heated  by 
the inner canister, causing the air to rise.
610 CFR 72.128 requires that spent fuel storage, high-level  radioactive waste 
storage, and other systems that might contain or handle radioactive materials 
associated with spent fuel  or high-level radioactive waste be designed to ensure 
adequate safety under normal and accident conditions.  These systems must be 
designed with a heat-removal  capability having testability and reliability consistent 
with its importance  to safety.  
4-3  a)  Justify that the application  of the thermal energy balance requested  in RAI 4-2 would 
not result in concrete temperatures that exceed the acceptable  limits specified in the 
cask Topical Safety Analysis Reports (TSARs).  
b)  If the concrete temperature limits are exceeded, then justify that the concrete used to 
construct the TranStor and HI-STORM  casks will not be degraded and result in a 
radiological release.  
•  The TSARs for the TranStor and HI-STORM  casks present calculations bounding 
the maximum temperature of the casks.  The results included in the individual 
TSARs are based upon the temperature limits discussed in RAI 4-1.  
0  10 CFR 72.128 requires that spent fuel storage, high-level radioactive waste 
storage, and other systems that might contain or handle radioactive  materials 
associated with spent fuel  or high-level  radioactive waste be designed to ensure 
adequate safety under normal and accident conditions.  These systems must be 
designed with a heat-removal  capability having testability and reliability consistent 
with  its importance to safety.  In addition,  10 CFR 72.236(f) requires that the cask 
systems be designed to provide adequate heat removal capacity without active 
cooling systems.
7CHAPTER 5-OPERATION  SYSTEMS
The following regulatory  requirements are applicable to the RAls in this chapter:  10 CFR 
72.24(b), (d)(1)(2),  (f);  72.40(a)(1),  (a)(5), (13);  72.44(c)(1);  72.104(b);  72.122(f),  (g),  (h),  (i), (), 
(k),  (I);  and 72.2360) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission,  1997).  It should be noted that other 
regulatory requirements  may be applicable to this chapter.  
Chapter 5 General 
5-1  Discuss how the operating  restrictions specified in Appendix A of the PFSF License 
Application will be accommodated  by the operating systems described in Chapter 5 of 
the PFSF SAR.  
Appendix A of the PFSF license application  identifies numerous operating  constraints 
placed on handling and storing canisters.  These restrictions were not discussed in 
the SAR and may need to be included as licensing requirements for the PFSF.  For 
example, the license application imposes limits on the minimum temperature for 
lifting the transfer casks, ambient temperature  limits for handling a load, and vent 
inspection intervals.  [10 CFR 72.24(g)].
8CHAPTER 6-SITE GENERATED WASTE CONFINEMENT  AND  MANAGEMENT 
The following regulatory  requirements are applicable to RAIs  in this chapter:  10 CFR 72.104; 
72.122; 72.126; and 72.128 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission,  1997).  It should be noted that 
other regulatory requirements  may be applicable  to this chapter.  
0  There  are no further requests for this section at this time.
9CHAPTER 7-RADIATION  PROTECTION
The following  regulatory requirements are applicable  to the RAls in this chapter:  10 CFR 
72.24(e),  (1)(1),  (2),  (m);  72.40(a)(5),  (13);  72.92(c); 72.94(c); 72.104;  72.106(a), (b); 
72.122(h)(3),  (5);  72.128; 72.130;  10 CFR 20.1101;  20.1201; 20.1207;  20.1208; 20.1301; 
20.1302; 20.1501; 20.1502;  20.1601 (a), (b),  (c), (d), (e); 20.1602;  20.1701; 20.1702;  20.1801; 
20.1802; and 20.2106 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission,  1997).  It is noted that other regulatory 
requirements  may be applicable to this chapter.  
7-1  Revise the calculation of the impacts of the accident  using the release fractions and 
methodology  contained  in Interim  Staff Guidance-5  (ISG-5),  Accident Dose Calculations 
(Nuclear Regulatory Commission,  1998) to show compliance with the accident dose 
limits  in 10 CFR 72.106(b).  
"  The calculation  in the SAR has been conducted  inappropriately.  The use of a 
respirable  fraction of 5%  for the release of Co-60 is not appropriate. The SAR cites 
Table XX of SAND80-2124 to justify the use of this fraction.  However, page 39 of this 
document indicates that this fraction was measured for particulates released from the 
interior of the fuel via a burst-rupture  mechanism. The majority of the source of Co-60 
from the spent fuel would  be from the CRUD on the exterior of the fuel assemblies.  
"  The licensee's calculation of accident impacts  in the SAR does not follow the most 
recent staff guidance on calculating the consequences of a postulated  loss-of
confinement  event. The current staff guidance on this calculation  is published  by the 
Spent Fuel Project Office as Interim Staff Guidance - 5 (ISG-5) (Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission,  1998).  
(See also  RAI  8-4)
10CHAPTER 8-ANALYSIS  OF DESIGN  EVENTS
The following  regulatory requirements are applicable to the  RAls in this chapter:  10 CFR 72.11; 
72.24(a), (d),  (e), (k),  (m);  72.26; 72.32; 72.40(a)(1),  (13);  72.44(c);  72.92; 72.94; 72.102(c),  (d), 
(f);  72.104; 72.106(a),  (b);  72.120(a); 72.122(b),  (d), (g),  (h),  (i), (j), (I);  72.124; 72.126(d); 
72.128; and 72.236 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission,  1997).  It should be noted that other 
regulatory requirements  may be applicable to this chapter.  
Section  8.1  Accident Analysis 
8-1  Based on the requirement of 10 CFR 72.126(b) justify the appropriateness  and safety 
classification  of the radiation alarm systems to be installed in the PFSF and describe how 
the alarm systems described in the SAR will be used to inform the operators  of a 
radiation release.  
"  Section 3.3.3.2 of the SAR states that radiation  monitors shall be utilized during the 
canister transfer process to ensure that occupational  exposures are within  10 CFR 
Part 20 limits and during the storage process to ensure that doses to the public are 
within  10 CFR 72.104 limits.  
"*  Section  3.3.3.1  of the TSAR does not identify the alarm system as important to 
safety.  
10 CFR 72.126(b) requires that radiological alarm systems be provided  in 
accessible work areas as appropriate to warn operating  personnel of radiation 
and airborne radioactive material  concentrations above a given setpoint and of 
concentrations  above control limits of radioactive  material in effluents.  Radiation 
alarm systems must be designed with provisions for calibration and operability 
testing.  
8-2  Regarding  "hanging bombs," the following information  is needed: 
"*  The number of training flights that the National  Guard and Air Force conduct per 
year with  live ordinance.  
"*  The flight path or routes of these training flights.  
"*  The net explosive weight of the typical ordinances  used.  
"*  The probability of occurrence  of live ordinance to fail to drop when released.  
"*  The mechanism for failure.
11"*  The emergency or contingency  plans for failure to release the live ordinance.  
"*  The probability that a failure could result in an unintentional release over the PSF 
ISFSI and result in an impact to the facility.  
"*  The consequences  of such an impact if  found to be credible.  
8-3  Concerning  wildfires, the following  information  is needed: 
"•  The annual probability of a fire severe enough to reach the PSF ISFSI site.  
"•  The fire magnitude, duration, flame propagation, heat generation, etc.  
"*  The impact of a fire (direct heat, smoke generation,  lack of cooling of the casks) 
for a prolonged period of time on the casks.  
"*  The consideration of casks in various operational modes (storage, transfer, etc) 
to assess worst case impact.  
"*  The emergency procedures for external fires.  
Section 8.2.7.3  Accident Dose Calculations 
8-4  (a)  Justify neglecting dose pathways other than the inhalation  pathway in evaluating the 
impacts  of a loss of confinement  accident from a spent fuel cask.  
(b)  Justify neglecting these pathways  in showing compliance  with the accident dose 
limits  in 10 CFR 72.106.  
*  The calculation of dose in this section includes only dose from the inhalation  of 
the released material as it passes a receptor.  
Other pathways (eg., direct radiation from radionuclides deposited  on the ground, 
ingestion of contaminated food,  and incidental  soil ingestion) were not included.  
Calculations  provided for the ingestion pathway  in response to the first round of 
RAIs neglect to consider the ingestion  of potentially contaminated meat and dairy 
products from livestock grazing on the land within the two mile radius assumed.  
(See also RAI  7-1)
12CHAPTER 9-CONDUCT  OF OPERATIONS
The following  regulatory  requirements are applicable  to the  RAIs in this chapter:  10 CFR 
72.24(e),  (h), (i), (j),  (k),  (p);  72.28(a), (b),  (c),  (d); 72.30(d)(1); 72.32(a);  72.40(a)(4),  (9), (11), 
(13)(i);  72.44(b)(4),  (5);  72.144(d); 72.190;  72.192; 72.194; and 73.21(a),  (b)(i),  (iii),  (v),  (viii),  (x), 
and (xii)  (Nuclear Regulatory Commission,  1997).  It should be noted that other regulatory 
requirements  may be applicable to this chapter.  
Section 9.1  Organizational Structure 
9-1  Describe the frequency and scope of any audits or inspections to be conducted  by the 
corporate  organization [NUREG-1567,  revised (Section 10.5.1.1)].  
Section 9.1.1.1  Private Fuel Storage L.L.C. Functions, Responsibilities, and Authorities 
9-2  Provide  information  on the Quality Assurance Audit Program for the PFSF including  the 
audit frequency and the methods for communicating  and documenting  findings 
"*  NUREG-1567,  revised (Section 10.4.1) discusses the inclusion of this information.  
"  The frequency of the audits and the methods for communicating  and documenting 
the findings should  be specified as described  NUREG-1 567, revised 
(Section  10.4.1)  so that the NRC staff can evaluate the adequacy of the audit 
program.  
Section 9.1.2.2.2  Radiation  Protection Manager 
9-3  Clarify the organizational independence  of the Radiation  Protection  Manager.  
The functions of the radiation  protection entity are to be separate from the entity 
responsible for facility operations [NUREG-1 567, (Section  10.5.1.2)].  However, 
Section 9.1.2.2.2,  Radiation Protection  Manager, and Figure 9.1-3, Operational 
Organization,  both indicate that the Radiation  Protection  Manager reports directly to 
the General  Manager/Chief Operating Officer who is the person responsible for 
conducting  operations.
13Section 9.1.2.1.1  Safety Review Committee
9-4  Clarify the authorities and membership of the Safety Review Committee.  
"The  Safety Review Committee should have appropriate review and approval 
authority [NUREG-1567,  revised (Section 10.5.1.2)].  However, the PFSF response 
to RAI 9-7  noted that the Safety Review Committee "has no approval authority or 
responsibility." 
"  Section  9.1.2.1.1  of the SAR defines the membership of the Safety Review 
Committee as the General Manager/Chief Operating  Officer and, as a minimum, staff 
members from four functional areas.  The SAR does not prohibit these individuals 
being the functional group leads, thereby allowing that the Safety Review Committee 
and the Operational  Review Committee could be staffed  by the same persons.  The 
NRC would consider this an inappropriate  reduction in the independence of the 
safety review functions.  
Section 9.1.3.1.13 Emergency Preparedness Coordinator 
9-5  Provide a commitment to require that staff with expertise  in developing  and implementing 
a systematic approach to training  will be used to support the training program  at the 
PFSF.  
Section  9.3.1  (Training Program) of the PFSF SAR commits to developing a training 
program using a systematic approach to training  (SAT).  Proper development and 
implementation  of a SAT requires experience  in such a program.  The personnel 
qualification  requirements  for the emergency  preparedness coordinator  (EPC) that 
are defined in Section 9.1.3.1.13  (Emergency Preparedness Coordinator) of the SAR 
do not include experience with developing or implementing  an SAT.  However, the 
EPC is given responsibility for administration of the training program  in SAR Section 
9.3.4 (Administration and Records).  The SAR should include SAT experience  in the 
qualification  requirements for the EPC or should commit to acquiring qualified 
support for initial development and implementation of the SAT.  If qualified support is 
acquired for initial SAT development,  continued program  implementation  could be 
transferred to the PFSF staff after that staff is sufficiently familiarized  with the SAT 
process.
14Section 9.3 Training Program
9-6  For initial and refresher training: 
Define the methods for evaluating certified operator trainee mastery of the training 
objectives  including written and oral tests and walk-through  exercises.  Include the 
pass/fail criteria to be used.  
If applicable,  define criteria for determining overall certified operator proficiency and any 
criteria for dismissal from the program.  
The description of the training program should identify the methods for evaluating 
specific and overall trainee performance  including the pass/fail criteria that will be 
used in the training and certification  of operators.  Their inclusion is required so that 
the  NRC staff can determine  that the PFSF training program  is consistent with those 
of other nuclear facilities.  
Section  9.3.2.2 Job Specific Certification and Training 
[SEE  RAI 9-7  SECOND TO LAST  BULLET] 
Section 9.4.2.2 Records to be Maintained 
[SEE LAST ITEM  OF RAI 9-7]
15CHAPTER 9-CONDUCT  OF OPERATIONS - GENERAL
9-7  The following  refinements to the SAR that are necessary to clarify  commitments and for 
the SAR to function as a continuing reference for the evaluation  of the safe operation  of 
the PFSF.  
Section 9.1.3.1.4 (Lead Mechanic/Operator):  The requirement for the Lead 
Mechanic/Operator  to be a licensed  locomotive operator does not support or 
enhance the skills required for performing  mechanical operations important to safety 
at the PFSF.  This requirement can be deleted, or its relevance to licensed PFSF 
operations should be explained.  
[This appears  on SAR page 9.3-1.] 
"  Section 9.3 (Training Program):  This section  of the SAR should define the methods 
for evaluating the overall effectiveness  of the training program including  review  of 
performance on tests, performance on walk through evaluations, on-the-job 
performance, and feedback from trainees, supervisors, and instructors.  
"  Section 9.3.2.2 (Job Specific and Certification Training):  Revise the statement 
regarding additional  or job specific training on page 9.3-4 to state:  "Whenever 
additional or job-specific training is required, the "Systematic Approach to Training" 
shall be used to  ....  Exceptions to the use of the SAT method  shall be approved on a 
case basis by the  Emergency Preparedness Coordinator." 
"  Section 9.3.2.2  (Job Specific and Certification  Training):  Clarify the entry 
"transportation" on the list of topics to be addressed  in the operator training program.  
It is not clear how this topic is to be related to licensed  operations.  
"  Section 9.3.2.2  (Job Specific and Certification  Training):  This section  of the SAR 
should include a  list of equipment or controls that are important to safety and the 
operations or manipulations that must be performed for specific systems or 
components as a part of job specific operator training.  In lieu of a list of equipment or 
controls and the operations or manipulations,  provide a commitment that the SAT will 
identify equipment and controls important to safety for each storage system type, 
those operations and manipulations that must be performed for demonstrating 
proficiency, and that operators and supervisors  shall be certified for those operations 
associated with that storage system type.  
"  Section 9.4 (Normal Operations):  Section 9.4.1.1.1  (Administrative Procedures) 
should make a specific commitment  to conduct medical evaluations  of those PFSF 
staff members who are certified  for operations important to safety.  The commitment 
should reference use of ANSI/ANS Standard as listed on NRC Form 396.  Section
169.4.2.2 (Records to be Maintained)  of the SAR should include  records for the medical 
evaluations  of the physical conditions  of the certified  operators.
17CHAPTER  10-OPERATING  CONTROLS AND LIMITS
The following  regulatory requirements are applicable  in this chapter:  10 CFR 72.11; 72.24 (g); 
72.26; 72.44(c); 72.44(d);  72.104; 72.106; 72.164; 72.172; 72.234(a);  and 72.236 (Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission,  1997).  It should be noted that other regulatory  requirements  may  be 
applicable to this chapter.  
Section 10.2.1.2  Canisters Authorized for Use at the Private Fuel Storage Facility 
10-1  Provide a list of the items that will require visual  inspection/verification  at the PFSF to 
ensure the as-received fuel and the storage canisters meet the PFSF technical 
specifications  (RAI  10-3).  
The certification  of the casks is the basis for the preclusion of releases of material 
from the off-normal and accident conditions.  Assurance must be made that the 
casks comply with the assumptions used in the SAR prior to receipt by the facility.  
[10 CFR 72.82, Tests and Inspections].REFERENCES
Nuclear  Regulatory Commission.  1996.  Standard  Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage 
Facilities. NUREG-1567.  Draft Report for Comment.  Washington,  DC:  Nuclear 
Regulatory  Commission.  
Nuclear  Regulatory Commission.  1997.  Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage 
of Spent Nuclear  Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste.  Code of Federal Regulations.  
Title 10-Energy, Chapter 1-Nuclear Regulatory  Commission Parts 20, 72 and 100.  
Washington, DC:  U.S. Government  Printing Office.  
Sandia National  Laboratories.  1981.  Transportation  Scenarios  for Commercial Spent Fuel.  
SAND-80 2124.  Albuquerque,  NM:  Sandia National Laboratories.
19SECTION 2 - EMERGENCY  PLANRequest for Additional Information
Private  Fuel Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report Section 9.5 
and Private Fuel Storage  Facility Emergency  Plan 
Each individual  RAI describes information needed by the staff to complete review of the 
application  and/or the SAR and to determine whether the applicant has demonstrated 
compliance  with the regulatory requirements.  Where an individual  RAI relates to the applicant's 
apparent failure to meet one or more regulatory requirements  or where an RAI focuses on 
compliance  issues associated with one or more specific  regulatory requirements  (e.g., specific 
design criteria  or accident  conditions), such requirements will be specified  in the individual  RAI.  
EMERGENCY  PLAN: 
The following  regulatory requirements are applicable:  10 CFR 72.32 
Emergency Plan 
Section 1 FACILITY DESCRIPTION 
EP-1  Describe  any impediments to egress along the path of the planned PFSF access 
road from Skull Valley Road.  
Section 2  TYPES OF ACCIDENTS  AND ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION 
EP-2  Provide the specific emergency action level (EAL)  for each of the identified  events 
that would result in the declaration of an emergency Alert at PFSF.  
The description of events that may result in declaration  of an Alert at PFSF 
appears to be adequate.  However, while general  information from which  EALs 
could be developed  is included in the description,  there is no specific definition  of 
EALs.  
Section 4  ORGANIZATION 
EP-3  Clarify or correct the number of managers  reporting to the General  Manager.  
Emergency  Plan Section 4.1 states that The General  Manager  has overall...  
and provides direction to the three functional managers  in the operations  of their 
department. From a review of the normal organization  chart, it appears that there 
are more than three managers reporting to the General Manager.
21Clarify whether the Security Sergeant is on-site at all times.
*  Section 4.2 states that the Security Sergeant acts as the Emergency Response 
Leader when the General  Manager or his designee are not on-site.  However, the 
availability  of the Sergeant is not discussed.  
EP-5  (a)  Identify the PFSF department(s)  responsible for activation of the 
emergency organization  during normal and off normal hours.  
*  Section 5.1.1,  states that when  a Alert is declared, the ERO will be activated 
and provides the methods, but does not address who will perform  the actions 
necessary for activation.  
(b)  Specify the department(s) from which personnel will be obtained to perform  off
site notifications during normal and  off normal hours.  
*  Section 5.1.1 states that the Emergency Response Leader is responsible for 
approval of offsite notifications,  but the plan is unclear as to the availability of 
personnel to perform this task.  
(c) Verify and justify that the minimum staffing of this department (or departments)  is 
sufficient to accomplish these tasks in a timely manner while attending to the 
department's  primary duties during the various potential events that are classified 
as emergencies.  
(d) Address  10 CFR 72.32(a)(8) in this response.  
*  10 CFR 72.32 (a)(8), states:  The notification and coordination  must be 
planned so that unavailability  of some personnel,  parts of the facility and 
some equipment will not prevent the notification and coordination.  
EP-6  (a) Clarify the role of the security force in providing  initial radiological assessment 
and radiological  safety during an  off hours radiological  event.  
(b)  State the training given to the security force in support of initial  radiological 
assessment  and radiological  safety response efforts,  if they are expected to 
perform such a role.  
(c)  If  the security force is not assigned the role of initial response for off hours 
radiological  events, clarify what department will respond and the associated 
qualifications and training  of the personnel.  Discuss and justify the timing of this 
response.
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EP-4The PFSF RAI  response of June 15,  1998, to Question 9-14 stated that 
Training  in emergency procedure  techniques will be provided to the security 
force to ensure capability  for immediate emergency assessment. However, 
the specialized  training items listed in Section 6.1  for security personnel  do 
not reference  any radiological  training as may be necessary for the safety  of 
initial responders.  
EP-7  (a)  Provide the minimum number of qualified fire brigade personnel that are required 
for response to a fire at PFSF and from where these personnel  will be obtained 
during off normal hours (e.g., call out, pager carrier, security force) 
(b)  Provide the expected response time for the fire brigade during off normal hours.  
"  The RAI  response of June 15,  1998 stated that two fire brigade members  will 
carry pagers, that an additional security person will carry a pager and that 
others will be available  via automated  call out.  It is recognized that the 
highest threat of fire is during routine operations when  normal staffing is 
available.  However, it is not clear what PFSF capabilities are to respond to a 
fire during off normal hours.  
"*  Describe the amount of water to be maintained for fire fighting  at the site and 
justify its adequacy.  
EP-8  (a)  Provide the PFSF department(s) or local agencies from which personnel will be 
obtained to operate the backup PFSF fire truck located  on the Goshute 
reservation when it is used in response to fires at PFSF.  
(b)  Provide the expected response time during normal and off normal hours.  
•  It is  recognized that the response of this fire truck is supplemental to the 
onsite fire truck.  However, the plan does not state what organization 
operates the truck.  
Section 5  NOTIFICATION AND  PROTECTIVE RESPONSE 
EP-9  Provide a description  of the following emergency response facilities: 
(a) The control point that is established to control access to the restricted area in the 
Security and Health Physics Building.  
(b) The facility  used by the Emergency Response  Organization  (ERO)  in the 
Administration  Building.
23(c)  The backup facility  in the Operations and Maintenance Building that may be used 
if either of the above facilities are unavailable.  
EP-10  (a)  Provide a description  of the area used for decontamination  of personnel or justify 
the lack of such an area.  
(b)  Provide a description  of decontamination  provisions/supplies  as they relate to 
emergency response.  
SAR Section 7.5.2 Equipment, Instrumentation  and Facilities  states that: 
Provisions  for personnel decontamination  are contained  in the Security and 
Health Physics Building.  However, no description of the area or 
provisions/supplies is provided.  
EP-1 1  (a)  Provide a description  of the communications  equipment present in each of the 
following  emergency response facilities: 
"•  the control  point that is established to control access to the restricted area in 
the Security and Health Physics  Building, 
"•  the facility used by the ERO in the Administration  Building and 
"*  the backup facility in the Operations and Maintenance  Building that may be 
used if either of the above facilities are unavailable.  
(b)  Describe the communication links available between these emergency response 
facilities and between these facilities and officials that will be notified in the event 
of an emergency at PFSF.  
*  The use of a given communications  system as primary or backup system 
should be noted.  
(c) Describe the communication links available between teams in the field and each 
of these emergency response facilities.  
(d)  Describe the communication links available between the primary and backup 
assembly areas and these emergency response facilities.  
It  would expedite review of the PFSF response if  a diagram depicting the 
communication links described were provided.  It  would also be helpful if  the 
expected  users on each end of these communication  links were noted.  It may
24be appropriate  to include the diagram or some variation  of it in the Emergency 
Plan.  
EP-12  (a)  Clarify or correct the frequency  of communication  equipment testing.  
Emergency Plan Section 5.5.1  refers to Section 8.2 for further explanation of 
communications equipment testing.  Section 8.2 describes the frequency  of 
drills, not the frequency of communications  equipment testing.  
(b)  State the frequency of emergency  response equipment and supplies inventory.  
(c)  Provide a brief description of the of the program for maintaining fire protection 
systems and equipment in accordance  with 
10 CFR Part 72.32 (a) (5).  
EP-1 3  Provide a description  of the emergency response related equipment deployed in 
each of the following  emergency response facilities: 
"*  The control  point that is established to control access to the restricted area in the 
Security and Health Physics Building.  
"*  The facility used by the ERO  in the Administration  Building.  
"•  The backup facility in the Operations and Maintenance Building that may be used 
if either of the above facilities are unavailable.  
EP-14  Provide the radiological  criteria which will be used for the following protective 
responses: 
"•  evacuation of emergency response facilities, 
"*  evacuation of the assembly area, 
"•  decontamination  of personnel, 
"*  use of respiratory  protective equipment,  and 
"*  evacuation of general  personnel from the site.
25EP-15  Provide a commitment to develop procedures to estimate the CEDE component of 
TEDE received  by responders exposed to a radioactive  material  plume, or justify its 
exclusion.  
The PFSF Emergency  Plan encompasses response to a radiological release.  In 
this unlikely event, personnel may be exposed to a mixture of radioactive 
material.  PFSF must be able to estimate the TEDE of emergency responders.  
Since exposure to radioactive  material associated with  spent fuel would entail a 
CEDE component of exposure, direct exposure measurements alone would not 
suffice to estimate individual TEDE.  Further, immediate response needs may not 
allow time for analysis of air samples and calculation of CEDE from  intake.  
Licensees  often establish an estimate of the expected CEDE component of a 
given dose received from plume exposure, to facilitate rapid assessment of 
personnel dose.  
Section 6  EMERGENCY RESPONSE  TRAINING 
EP-16  Clarify the specialized  training given to the Security Sergeant.  
Section 4 states that the Security Sergeant assumes the Emergency  Response 
Leader position if the General  Manager is unavailable.  However, Section 6 does 
not state that the Security Sergeants will receive specialized training for 
personnel responsible for management  of an emergency.  
EP-17  Clarify the frequency of training for ERO members.  
*  Section 6.1  indicates that personnel with  ERO responsibilities will receive training 
annually,  but then goes on to state that training procedures will specify the 
frequency of training.  
EP-1 8  (a)  Provide an estimate of the number of hours of specialized  emergency response 
training and retraining  provided for ERO members 
(b)  Provide an estimate of the number of hours of general  emergency response 
training and retraining  for general  staff.  
It is noted that training procedures will specify the details of training 
requirements and that the Emergency  Plan provides an adequate  summary 
of topics included  in training, but the plan does not provide  an estimate of the 
duration  of training.  
EP-19  (a)  Describe the training  provided on the topic of personnel and facility 
decontamination.
26(b)  What personnel are provided this training.
EP-20  Describe the training provided for local authorities associated with the Goshute 
reservation.  
The Emergency  Plan commits to offer an appropriate level of training to Tooele 
County personnel,  but no mention is made of training provided to local Goshute 
authorities.  
EP-21  (a) Describe the training that onsite fire  brigade members will  receive to qualify them 
in fire fighting using the onsite pumper truck.  
(b)  Describe  the training fire brigade members  receive  in the fighting of fires involving 
radioactive  material.  
(c)  Describe  the training that will be provided for those individuals who  may operate 
the PFSF fire truck located on the Goshute  reservation.
27(d)  Describe the training offsite support fire brigade members will receive in the 
fighting of fires involving radioactive  material.  
EP-22  Describe the training and qualifications of PFSF personnel who will operate the site 
ambulance.  
Section 10  OFFSITE ASSISTANCE, SUPPORT  AND RESOURCES 
EP-23  Provide the frequency of review and renewal  of letters of agreement established with 
Tooele County and any other involved offsite emergency response agencies.  
EP-24  Clarify the PFSF intention to meet periodically  (e.g., annually) with offsite 
organizations who support PFSF to review items of mutual  interest such as:  changes 
to the plan, emergency action level scheme, adequacy of equipment and supplies, 
notification  procedures and overall response coordination.  
EP-25  Describe provisions to modify security or safeguards measures for site access during 
an emergency.  
*  If the response involves safeguards  information,  appropriate confidentiality 
precautions should be taken.  
EP-26  Discuss the role of the Goshute or other appropriate authorities in emergency 
preparedness  activities at PFSF.  
*  The Emergency  Plan adequately describes the relationship with support 
agencies within Tooele County.  However, no mention  is made of a relationship 
with the Goshute  Reservation or other appropriate authorities, if any.
28CHAPTER 9-CONDUCT  OF OPERATIONS
Section 9.1.3.1.13  Emergency Preparedness Coordinator 
9-5.1  Justify the compatibility of the qualifications  and responsibilities  of the Emergency 
Preparedness  Coordinator or increase the qualifications to a professional  level 
similar to that of the Radiation  Protection  Manager as indicated  in the PFSF 
response to RAI  No. 1, Question 9-5.  
The PFSF SAR RAI  No.1,  Question 9-5 response described the qualifications  of 
the Emergency Preparedness  Coordinator (EPC).  The response referenced 
SAR Section 9.1.3.1.2 as describing the EPC qualifications.  This SAR Section 
describes the qualifications of the Radiation  Protection  Manager, not the EPC.  
The EPC qualifications are described in SAR Section  9.1.3.1.13.  These 
qualifications call for a high school diploma and two years of emergency 
preparedness  experience and are different than the qualifications of the Radiation 
Protection  Manger.  It is noted that the RAI response specified that the EPC 
would have a minimum of four years of working experience in radiation 
protection.  This is similar to the level of experience expected  of a radiation 
protection  technician.  
A review of the EPC duties in the Emergency  Plan and SAR Section 9.1.2.2.14 
indicates that the position is responsible for a wide range  of duties, including 
interface with offsite organizations,  conduct of the training program,  maintenance 
of the emergency preparedness  program and conduct of drills.  The qualifications 
stated for this position do not appear compatible with the responsibilities of the 
position.  The previous  RAI response  did not address this issue adequately.
29SECTION  3 - SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY  PLANRequest for Additional  Information 
Private  Fuel Storage Facility Independent  Spent Fuel Storage  Installation 
Physical  Protection  Plan, Revision 0,  Dtd June 20, 1997 
The regulatory requirements  of 10 CFR Part 73 are  applicable to this  request for additional 
information.  
Page  Paragraph  Comments
SG-1  1-1  1-2
SG-2  1-3 
SG-3  3-1 
SG-4  3-3
Definitions 
3.1 
3.3
SG-5  4-2  4.3 
SG-6  4.4
Revise the plan so that it follows the updated  Standard Review 
Plan  (NUREG-  1619).  
NUREG-1619  is based upon the new 10 CFR 73.51.  
Protected area (PA)  barrier 
Clarify the height of the fence.  
Most barriers are constructed  of a chain link fence topped with 
barbed  wire to a total of 8 feet.  
Clarify whether the Central Alarm  Station Operator is also one of 
the on-duty security personnel for each  shift.  
The CAS operator must be trained to perform the appropriate 
duties.  
Justify the application of 10 CFR 73.56 regarding access 
authorization  to this facility.  
10 CFR 73.56 is usually  applied to power reactor sites.  
Clarify that the secondary alarm station (SAS) operator discussed 
in the second paragraph is not one of the onsite security force.  
Clarify plans for implementation  of the illumination  requirement.
31The illumination requirement  (10 CFR 73.51 (d)(2)) states that 
illumination must be sufficient to permit adequate assessment of 
unauthorized  penetration of or activities within the protected area.  
The plan should so state.  
Specify that individuals  performing search function are trained in 
searching for firearms, explosive, and incendiary devices.  
Last paragraph  - Specify that the Security  Force Captain  or 
designee  will assure that all  packages they allow into the PA are 
suitably identified given the absence of the addressee.
SG-9  6-1  6.1  a)  Clarify that the intrusion detection system has line supervision and 
is tamper indicating.  
The second sentence of this paragraph  is not clear.  
b)  Paragraph A - Commit to the criteria for detecting and intruder 
crossing the zone of detection stated in Regulatory  Guide 5.44 
Perimeter Intrusion Alarm Systems.
Response force - Either find a method to reduce the response 
time for offsite responders or supplement the authoritative 
response with additional security force  capabilities, such as 
weapons.  
As part of the review of the ISFSI  physical protection plan the 
reviewer attempted to establish a reasonable response time which 
could be expected from the designated offsite responders.  The 
response time appears to be excessive and may not prevent a 
loss of control at the facility.
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SG-7  5-1 5.3
SG-8  5-2
SG-1 1 9-1 9.2SECTION 4 - LICENSE APPLICATION  - INTERMODAL  TRANSFER POINTThe following  regulatory  requirements are applicable  to the  RAIs in this chapter: 
10 CFR 70.20a, 71.5, 72.2, 72.6 and 73.37.  
ITP-1  Provide a detailed discussion of how shipments of spent fuel would be completed  from 
the time they arrive at the intermodal transfer point (ITP)  until they are received at ISFSI 
site. The discussion should include both the proposed options for rail and highway 
shipments, and address the following items: 
(a)  PFS's role in completing the shipments once they've arrived at the  ITP (e.g., 
common or contract carrier, freight forwarder, broker, etc.).  
Include a description  of the specific activities conducted by PFS personnel 
at the  ITP, and in-transit between the ITP and ISFSI site.  
(b)  The actions PFS needs to undertake to comply with Department of 
Transportation  regulations for motor and/or rail carriers  if PFS is acting as a 
contract or common carrier.  
This includes both regulations for qualifying as a carrier, and for 
complying with carrier safety requirements for rail and/or highway.  
(c)  The responsibilities of PFS's shippers (utility customers) and carriers for 
providing  physical protection  under 10 CFR Part 73.  
The discussion, at a minimum, needs to address the following areas: 
shipment notifications,  cask surveillance  (escorts), communications 
(including two hour call-ins), and response arrangements with local law 
enforcement personnel.  
The discussion should also focus on how physical protection 
requirements  in these areas are implemented while spent fuel casks are 
in storage "incident to transit" at the ITP, as well as in transit between the 
ITP and ISFSI site.  
(d)  Responsibilities of PFS (if any), its shippers and carriers for preparing casks for 
shipment (e.g., marking  and labeling of casks, placarding,  shipping papers and 
declarations).  
The discussion should focus on PFS's activities at the ITP, and in transit 
between the  ITP and  ISFSI site.
34(e)  Ownership of ITP facilities and equipment, and agreements concerning the use of 
such facilities and equipment.  
(f)  The role of PFS, shippers and others in providing  emergency response at the 
ITP, and in-transit between the  ITP and ISFSI site.  
Since the applicant will not take licensed  possession of the spent fuel at the  ITP, PFS 
should clarify whether it intends to act as either a common or contract carrier, broker, or 
freight forwarder in transporting  spent fuel to the ISFSI  site.  Further, PFS should clarify 
whether it believes it could transport spent fuel as a private carrier from the ITP to the 
PFS site under the general  license provisions in 10 CFR 71.12, even though it does not 
take possession of the spent fuel until  receipt at the ISFSI  site.  The information  provided 
in response to this RAI  is  needed to assess PFS's role in the actual transport of spent 
fuel from the ITP to the ISFSI  site.  The results of this assessment would be used to 
determine if the  ITP needs to be included  in a license issued  under Part 72, or whether 
activities at the  ITP are covered under the Department of Transportation  regulations for 
shipping hazardous  materials.
35SECTION  5 - LICENSE APPLICATION - FINANCIAL 
NON-PROPRIETARY  VERSION
36The following regulatory  requirements are applicable to the  RAIs in this section:  10 CFR 72.11, 
72.22, 72.30, 72.54, 72.130, 72.136(l),  and 10 CFR 61.55.  It should be noted that other 
regulatory  requirements  may be applicable to this section.  
1-1  Contains  proprietary information.  
1-2  Contains  proprietary information.  
1-3  Provide the approximate costs of any  rail alternative which  PFS is considering.  Clarify 
whether the costs of the rail options are included  in  the $100  million construction  cost 
estimate  in the License Application.
37